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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

NOAH SHERMAN SCHRODER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 47726-2020
Ada County Case No. CR0l-19-4069

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

------------)

Has Noah Schroder failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed sentences of two years indeterminate for possession of a controlled substance,
five years indeterminate for eluding, and five years with four years determinate for destruction of
evidence, all consecutive to each other and concurrent with a federal sentence?
ARGUMENT
Schroder Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
An officer stopped Schroder for a traffic violation. (PSI, pp. 3, 133.) The officer noticed

signs that Schroder was under the influence of a controlled substance and may be involved in
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transporting controlled substances. (PSI, pp. 3, 134-35.) The officer also learned from dispatch
that Schroder was on federal parole or probation for trafficking and that his address was a house
suspected ofhaving a connection to drugs. (PSI, p. 135.) After a backup officer arrived, Schroder
fled the scene in his truck. (PSI, p. 3, 137-38.)
The officers followed Schroder with lights and sirens on, but because his driving was not
erratic or dangerous at that time they made no other efforts to stop him. (PSI, pp. 3, 138-40.)
When additional officers were able to respond, police attempted to block in Schroder in a parking
lot. (PSI, p. 140.) Schroder avoided the officers, however, by "hopping a parking curb and
proceeding back [by] the same route." (PSI, p. 140.) Schroder's evasions then got more reckless
as he drove over a grassy median, nearly hitting a police car, and continued down the wrong lane
of traffic. (PSI, pp. 140-42, 157-58.) He also drove across the lawns of residences to avoid the
police, damaging property and endangering people. (PSI, pp. 3, 148-51, 153-54, 158-59, 163.) He
then deliberately rammed a car to get past it. (PSI, pp. 155, 159, 163-64, 170-71.)
The chase ended with Schroder's truck disabled near Albertson Stadium on the Boise State
University campus. (PSI, pp. 3, 142, 220.) In the truck officers found cocaine. (PSI, pp. 3, 14244.) Schroder fled on foot into the Boise River. (PSI, pp. 3, 220-21.) He admitted having used
cocaine earlier in the day and having consumed "a large amount of cocaine and methamphetamine"
during the chase to avoid their detection by law enforcement. (PSI, pp. 3, 226.)
The state charged Schroder with felony counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault,
possession of a controlled substance, destruction of evidence, and eluding, and misdemeanor
counts of malicious injury to property, leaving the scene of an accident (three counts), and resist
and obstruct. (R., pp. 34-3 7.) Pursuant to a plea agreement Schroder pled guilty to the possession,
eluding, and destruction of evidence counts and the state dismissed the remaining counts. (R., p.
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43.) The district court imposed consecutive sentences two years indeterminate for possession, five
years indeterminate for eluding, and five years with four years determinate for destruction of
evidence, all concurrent with the re-imposed federal sentence for distribution of a controlled
substance. (R., pp. 59-63.) Schroder filed a notice of appeal timely from the entry of judgment.
(R., pp. 65-68.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks "whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise ofreason." State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
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C.

Schroder Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887,895,392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P .3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable '"if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution."' Bailey. 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court applied the correct legal standards to its exercise of discretion. (Tr., p.
16, L. 21 - p. 17, L. 13.) The district court emphasized Schroder's "substantial" criminal record
and the "choices" Schroder made and Schroder' s "lack of understanding" how those choices
affected other people. (Tr., p. 18, L. 5 - p. 19, L. 12.) It then imposed aggregate sentences of 12
years with four years determinate on the three felony convictions before it. (Tr., p. 19, L. 22 - p.
20, L. 7.)
The record supports the district court's findings and the sentences imposed. Schroder has
a criminal record dating back to 2001, which includes 15 misdemeanor convictions (including two
DUis, a battery, and a domestic assault), four prior felony convictions (all drug related), and eight
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probation violations.

(PSI, pp. 6-12.)

He committed the instant offenses while on federal

probation. (PSI, p. 12.) The district court's finding that Schroder's criminal record is substantial
and supports a prison sentence (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-7) is amply supported by the record.
Likewise, Schroder' s actions in this case justify the sentence. As shown above in detail,
Schroder fled from officers, damaging property and endangering the lives of others. The victims
of his dangerous conduct have been very adversely affected. (PSI, pp. 4-5.) The record shows
that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion in imposing aggregate sentences of 12
years with four determinate for the three felonies of conviction.
On appeal Schroder contends the district court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 2-3.) His arguments fail to show any abuse of sentencing discretion.
Schroder first argues that his sentence is excessive in light of Idaho's statutory policy that
"'prison space"' be used for "'those who commit the most serious offenses or who have the highest
likelihood of offending in the future."'

(Appellant's brief, p. 2 (quoting LC. § 20-223(1)).)

However, as stated by the district court, if Schroder "had simply been in possession of cocaine and
been arrested, had he stopped when police tried to pull him over, we might be talking about
probation today." (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 12-14.) Schroder chose to escalate his crime into a "most serious
offense" and his choices and prior record amply demonstrate a "likelihood of offending in the
future."
Schroder next argues the district court was erroneously "critical of Mr. Schroder at
sentencing for not discussing the impact that his actions had on his victims." (Appellant's brief,
p. 3.) However, as Schroder's own citations and quotes show, Schroder did not mention "the
impact [his actions] had on the people whose lives [he] put in jeopardy, whose property [he] put
in jeopardy." (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1-5.) Schroder's version of events was that he "just kept driving
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around until I got out on foot and jumped in the river." (PSI, p. 5.) He failed to mention the
property he damaged or the lives of others he put in danger. In allocution he apologized for his
"recklessness in the community" (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-5), but spent most of his statement explaining
how his behavior resulted from being "in a very dark place," and how he's done better since (Tr.,
p. 15, L. 3 - p. 16, L. 19). The district court's determination that Schroder had discussed how the
night in question affected him but did not mention how it affected others he directly impacted was
not clearly erroneous.
Finally, Schroder points out that his engagement in treatment of his addictions and opening
a business after the crimes in question are mitigating factors which led the PSI investigator to
recommend probation. (Appellant's brief, p. 3.) However, the district court specifically stated it
did not "want to diminish the work [Schroder had done] recently," but concluded that the
seriousness of Schroder's crimes outweighed his recent efforts.

(Tr., p. 19, Ls. 13-21.) It

specifically rejected the PSI investigator's recommendation of probation, which was based on
Schroder's recent efforts, because that recommendation "ignores a lot," including that Schroder
was bound for federal prison for the remaining two years ofhis federal sentence. (Tr., p. 17, L. 14
- p. 18, L. 4.) Even more important to the district court, however, were Schroder's "substantial"
criminal record and Schroder's choice to put others in danger. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-14.)
Schroder committed three serious felonies, has a substantial criminal record, and has a poor
track record on probation. The district court imposed reasonable sentences, and Schroder has
shown no abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2020.

/ s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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